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POOLE V. POOLE

IS MENTAL CRUELTY A GROUND FOR
PARTIAL DIVORCE?
Poole v. Poole1
Plaintiff-appellee filed suit for a partial divorce against
her husband, defendant-appellant, the bill of complaint
charging that defendant had "treated her with great
cruelty, harshness and brutality, and that his conduct has
become so intolerable that she was obliged to leave his
house". Defendant's answer denied these allegations.
Evidence was introduced to show that the husband had
often' brought his relatives to live in his home and that the
wife had strenuously objected to each of these prolonged
stays. The leaving of the wife eventually resulted as a
culmination of these visits. The record of the case revealed that the marital course of the parties was not a
smooth one, being marred by frequent arguments and quarrels resulting from defendant's drinking and sprees, at
which times he would heap curses and abusive language
on the plaintiff, particularly language amounting to unjustifiable accusations of infidelity on the part of the plaintiff with a mutual friend of the parties. The plaintiff also
testified to acts of physical violence, her testimony being
corroborated only as to one instance of such assaults.
From a decree granting plaintiff a divorce a mensa et thoro,
the defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed.
The subject of cruelty has been treated by the Court
of Appeals under four distinct phases or aspects. These
phases may be generally classified as follows: first, cruelty
as a distinct ground for divorce a mensa et thoro as provided by statute 2; second, cruelty operating to cause a constructive desertion in cases where the conduct of the guilty
spouse forces the other to leave, thereby entitling the innocent spouse to a divorce on the ground of desertion, absolute or partial, depending on the length of time"; third,
cruelty as justifying the injured spouse in living apart
without thereby being guilty of desertion; fourth, cruelty
operating to revive offenses constituting grounds for either
See also, for
1176 Md. 696 (Unreported case), 6 A. (2d) 243 (1939).
a recent case on cruelty, decided after this casenote was prepared, Payne
v. Payne, 16 A. (2d) 165 (Md. 1940).
, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, See. 41.
'Pattison v. Pattison, 132 Md. 362, 103 A. 977 (1918).
'Crouch v. Crouch, 150 Md. 608, 133 A. 725, 47 A. L. R. 681 (1926);
Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (1933).
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partial5 or absolute divorce which had been previously
condoned. In treating the subject of cruelty under these
separate headings, the Court has recognized varying degrees and types in each instance. Although the scope of
this note is limited to the first type, viz., cruelty as a distinct ground for a divorce a mensa et thoro as provided by
statute, it may be here noted that in some cases, divorces
a vinculo have been granted on grounds of desertion, the
desertion being of the constructive type, and where the
cruelty giving rise thereto would appear not to have been
great enough as such to constitute ground for a partial
divorce. 7
Article 16, Section 41, provides that divorces a mensa
et thoro may be decreed for three causes, to wit: first,
cruelty of treatment; secondly, excessively vicious conduct;
thirdly, abandonment and desertion. Abandonment and
desertion is, of course, a separate and distinct ground, but
inasmuch as cruelty of treatment and excessively vicious
conduct seem to be so closely related, it might be pointed
out that the court has never had occasion to give an exact
definition of "excessively vicious conduct". The closest
thing to such a definition is by way of negation in cases of
Shutt v. Shutt8 where it was held that drunkenness did
not constitute excessively vicious conduct, and in McKane
v. McKane9 where it was held that cursing and use of vile
epithets were likewise insufficient.
The instant case seems to be somewhat of a departure
from earlier cases decided by the Court of Appeals construing "cruelty of treatment". The Court has repeatedly
said that divorces a mensa et thoro are not favored in this
State, as the parties are thrown back on society "in the
undefined and dangerous characters of a wife without a
husband and a husband without a wife".1" As a consequence of this attitude, divorces granted on the ground of
cruelty seem to be limited until the present case to instances of physical violence. Moreover, even in cases
where there was some evidence of physical violence, the
Court has refused a divorce for the reason that there was
no proof of any systematic or continued cruelty of treatment which would endanger life, limb, or health. In sevHilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914, 98 A. L. R. 1347 (1935).
Fisher v. Fisher, 93 Md. 298, 48 A. 833 (1901).
' Pattison v. Pattison, supra n. 3, Harding v. Harding, 22 Md. 337 (1864).
71 Md. 193, 17 A. 1024, 17 A. S. R. 519 (1889).
p152 Md. 515, 137 A- 288 (1927).
10 Coles v. Coles, 2 Md. Ch. 341 (1851). Bonwit v. Bonwit, 169 Md. 189,
181 A. 237 (1939).
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eral of the cases it has been stated that mere petulance of
manner, rudeness, and occasional sallies of passion" are not
sufficient to constitute cruelty." Evidence of a single act
of violence has very often been held insufficient by the
Court to constitute cruelty, probably for the reason that
such a single act did not satisfy the Court that there was
any danger to the plaintiff's life or limb in the future. 2
The earliest case to be found on the subject of cruelty
arose before the courts in Maryland had power or jurisdiction to grant decrees of divorce. 3 The case was one
brought by the wife for separate maintenance, or alimony,
for which relief it was incumbent upon her to establish
facts which would in the English courts have entitled her
to a divorce a mensa et thoro. Taking their definition
from several English cases decided in the Ecclesiastical
Court, the Court decided that "personal injury and words
of menace, importing the danger of actual bodily harm,
may be deemed cruel treatment, but not mere rudeness of
language".
In many cases subsequent to this case, there was evidence of the use of abusive language by the defendant, and
in some of them, unjust accusations of unchastity. No
serious consideration seems to have been given the evidence of harsh or abusive language in any of these cases
until the case of Schwab v. Schwab, 4 decided in 1923, in
which, in addition to the evidence of the defendant husband having called the plaintiff obscene names and having
accused her of illicit intercourse with himself before marriage and with other men, there was also conflicting evidence as to physical violence. The Court decided that
viewing the evidence as a whole, the acts of the defendant
over a long period of time were of such a character as to
" This language, originally used by Chancellor Kent in the New York
case of Barrere v. Barrere, 4 Johns Ch. 187 (1819) can be found, either in
its original form or in similar words, in almost all of the cruelty cases
decided in this state, among which are Daiger v. Daiger, 2 Md. Ch. 335
(1850) ; Harding v. Harding, 22 Md. 237 (1864) ; Childs v. Childs, 49 Md.
509 (1878) ; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 65 Md. 104, 3 A. 749 (1885) ; Sharp v.
Sharp, 105 Md. 581, 66 A. 463 (1907) ; Outlaw v. Outlaw, 122 Md. 695, 91
A. 1067 (1914) ; Bounds v. Bounds, 135 Md. 220, 108 A. 870 (1919);
Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 A. 743 (1925) ; Short v. Short, 151
Md. 444, 135 A. 176 (1926); Hillwood v. Hillwood, 159 Md. 167, 150 A.
286 (1930); Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 166 A. 441 (1933);
Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 296, 177 A. 464 (1935); Timanus v. Timanus,
177 Md. 686, 10 A. (2d) 322 (1940).
" Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 72, 34 A. R. 298 (1879); Goodhues v.
Goodhues, 90 Md. 292, 44 A. 990 (1899); Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md.
177, 127 A. 743 (1925) ; Gellar v. Gellar, 159 Md. 236, 150 A. 717 (1930).
28 Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544, 20 A. D. 402 (1832).
14 144 Md. 47, 124 A. 405 (1923).
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wreck the health and happiness of a person of ordinary
sensibility, and thus sufficient to constitute legal cruelty.
The next case in which accusations of infidelity were
given consideration by the Court was that of Silverberg v.
Silverberg,15 decided in 1925. In this case the Court said
"No form of cruelty is so intolerable as to make a wanton
and public charge of infidelity against a wife under circumstances which expose her to shame and contumely".
The Court then decided that these unjust accusations of
unchastity "considered in relation to the other acts of the
husband," (the nature of which acts are not revealed by
the reported opinion) were sufficient to constitute cruelty.
It is to be noted that in both of these cases the Court
seemed unwilling to base its decision entirely on the evidence of the imputations of adultery but cautiously added
the "other acts", whatever they may have been. Consequently, there appears to be no case until the instant one
wherein the Court seems to have relied on language alone
in granting a partial divorce or alimony without a divorce.
Such a conclusion seems inevitable in the instant case,
as the Court expressly states that the evidence of physical
violence would not avail the plaintiff, and that there was
no necessity to decide whether such evidence of physical
violence was sufficient reason for the desertion of the
defendant by the plaintiff.
Whether this case portends a somewhat less stringent
interpretation of the meaning of cruelty within our divorce
statute, it is of .course impossible to decide. However, in
view of the repeatedly strict interpretation heretofore
placed on -this statute, it seems unlikely that the Court
would go beyond this case as to any form of abusive language other than accusations of infidelity constituting legal
cruelty. This conclusion seems to be at least partially
justified by the direct holding in the case of Oertel v.
Oertel,16 decided in 1924, after the Schwab case, in which
it was held that the statement by the defendant husband
in the presence of others that the plaintiff-wife was "nutty"
and "feeble-minded", although unkind and inconsiderate,
could hardly be regarded as sufficient to justify granting a
divorce a mensa et thoro and would not constitute cruelty
within the meaning of the statute as construed by the
Court of Appeals.
A final query may be here injected as to whether, the
adoption by the Court of the view that unfounded imputa1 148 Md. 682, 130 A. 325 (1925).
1 145 Md. 177, 125 A. 545 (1924).
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tions of unchastity made by the husband will afford the
wife ground for a divorce a mensa et thoro, will be applied
in the reverse situation, i. e., where the wife is the accuser
and the husband the accused. As the status of the female
chastity has seemingly always been exalted over that of
the male, it is very probable that the husband who is
stigmatized unjustly as an adulterer, by a suspicious
spouse, would find less sympathy on the part of the Court.
The Legislature of Maryland has in at least two instances
demonstrated its esteem for the presumptive virtue of the
female. The first example may be found in Article 88 of
the Code providing that all words spoken falsely and
maliciously touching the character and reputation for
chastity of any woman shall be deemed slander. This
Article has of course been construed to make any defamation of a woman's reputation for chastity slanderous per se,
while it is incumbent upon the male, so defamed, to allege
and prove special damages resulting therefrom. The other
instance of this legislative discrimination occurred in
Article 16, Section 38, of the 1924 Code, which has since
been repealed by amendment in the 1939 Session, providing
that, inter alia, the premarital unchastity of the wife would
constitute ground for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii at the
suit of the husband. Like relief was never afforded the
wife for the philanderings of the husband consummated
prior to the marriage. The refusal by the Court to grant
relief to the male, unjustly accused of extra-marital relations, would certainly appear to be justifiable from a practical standpoint, as neither the lay nor legal mind would
ordinarily classify such accusations as "cruelty" to him.

